Our Gemara at the top of Amud Aleph, actually starting right at the end of 62b, encourages showing concern and care for friends, relatives, and countrymen:

הָאוֹהֵב אֶת שְׁכֵינָיו, וְהַמְקָרֵב אֶת קְרוֹבָיו, וְהַנּוֹשֵׂא אֶת בַּת אֲחוֹתוֹ,

One who loves his neighbors, and who draws his relatives close, and who marries the daughter of his sister, 

וְהַמַּלְוֶה סֶלַע לְעָנִי בִּשְׁעַת דׇּחְקוֹ — עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב אוֹמֵר: ״אָז תִּקְרָא וַה׳ יַעֲנֶה תְּשַׁוַּע וְיֹאמַר הִנֵּנִי״.

and who lends a sela to a pauper at his time of need, about him the verse states: “Then shall you call, and the Lord will answer; you shall cry, and He will say: Here I am” (Isaiah 58:9).

The Gemara considers it virtuous to show love and concern for those who are already somehow part of our close social network. It is not to the exclusion of helping outsiders of greater need, but is placing priority on insiders with equal need.  While at first glance this may seem selfish, the point of clan loyalty is to strengthen existing natural bonds thereby contributing to greater social security and stability in widening circles, and ensuring continuity of culture, tradition and values. 

In today’s Psychology of the Daf, we are going to examine a Maharal who comments on the phenomenon of marrying a niece, which leads to a discussion of broader implications of the nature of sexual morality and prohibitions.

The Maharal Be’er Hagolah (2:11) explains the positive moral value that our Gemara attributes to marrying a niece as follows: Really any time one tries to increase closeness to relatives it is a proper act. We find our forefathers sought to marry relatives and keep within their family, (presumably to intensify and preserve teachings and ethical modes of life within the clan carried by both parents equally.)  Our forefathers even married relations who would have been prohibited after the giving of the Torah, such as Yaakov marrying two sisters, and Amram marrying his aunt. If these relationships were intrinsically morally problematic, even if not yet prohibited by the Torah, our forefathers would have been repelled by the idea. However we see the opposite is true, as they sought out their relatives for marriage. The sexual prohibitions in the Torah are a known as chok, the kind of prohibition that is based on God’s decree without having an apparent and obvious moral reasoning. Maharal is suggesting that unlike theft or murder, the sexual prohibitions do not represent an intrinsic morality. 

A chok is a Torah rule that seemingly has no morally discernable reasons such as Shaatnez or mixing of milk and meat. While a mishpat, which includes civil laws such as theft and murder, has obvious social and moral value. The Rambam in Shemoneh Perakim (chapter 6) discusses the different mentality one should have in regard to a chok versus a mishpat. In the case of the Mishpat, a person should cultivate an inner attitude of naturally being disgusted by the prohibited behavior. While in regard to chok, on the contrary, one should abstain out of obedience to God’s will, despite desiring it.

Maharal is not the only one to suggest that forbidden sexual relationships have the status of chok. Ramban (Vayikra 18:6) says very similarly to Maharal, that in essence to be close to our relatives is positive, and the prohibitions against sex with certain relatives is a decree from God that contains sublime hidden wisdom. 

However, he also suggests that certain incestuous relationships are forbidden by the Torah because they will lead to sexuality for lustful gratification without the main intention of reproduction. The Rambam in the Guide (III:49) says something similar about incest as well.  Because such persons are so readily available due to their proximity (brothers in law and sisters in law) as well as their natural inclination to please (such as a daughter to a father), there would be too much temptation to engage in sexuality without the efforts of courtship and marriage, leading to lust for its own sake, without pro-social ends.  However, as a whole, Ramban maintains, like the Maharal that sexual prohibitions are chok.  The Rambam in Shemoneh Perakim that we referenced earlier, also includes sexual prohibitions within his categorical list of laws that are a chok, such as meat and milk and shaatnez.

However, there is a Gemara (Yoma 67a) which seems to contradicts this point of view and considers sexual prohibitions to be more of the mishpat variety:

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן, ״אֶת מִשְׁפָּטַי תַּעֲשׂוּ״ — דְּבָרִים שֶׁאִלְמָלֵא (לֹא) נִכְתְּבוּ דִּין הוּא שֶׁיִּכָּתְבוּ, וְאֵלּוּ הֵן: עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְגִלּוּי עֲרָיוֹת, וּשְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים, וְגָזֵל, וּבִרְכַּת הַשֵּׁם.

The Sages taught with regard to the verse: “You shall do My ordinances, and you shall keep My statutes to follow them, I am the Lord your God” (Leviticus 18:4), that the phrase: My ordinances, is a reference to matters that, even had they not been written, it would have been logical that they be written. They are the prohibitions against idol worship, prohibited sexual relations, bloodshed, theft, and blessing God, a euphemism for cursing the Name of God.

Additionally, the simple reading of certain sexual prohibitions in the Torah itself seems to declare that they are disgusting in nature, by referring them to be “zimah” (Vayikra 18:17 - zimah means a corrupt plan) or “Toevah” (28:22 an abhorrence). This indicates that some sexual prohibitions are self-understood as improper.

This might explain why the Maharsha explains this Gemara differently than the simple reading.  At first glance, the Gemara seems to be saying the commandments such as murder, idolatry, and sexual immorality are logical, and thus would be self-understood without having been recorded in the Torah.  Maharsha reads it in another way.  He says that these commandments were already given to the sons of Noah, and thus did not need to be recorded again in the Torah.  If we read the Gemara in accordance with the Maharsha, it no longer contradicts the Ramban and Maharal.

However, I would like to suggest another resolution.  It is notable that unlike his list in Shemoneh Perakim, when Rambam enumerates examples of chok and mishpat in Laws of Meila (8:8), he omits sexual prohibitions altogether! How do we account for this disparity? I believe there are two possible answers:

1. Sexual prohibitions are a hybrid. Certain prohibitions are logical and naturally abhorrent or destructive, such as incest or those which thwart reproduction, or family life. Those will be the ones which the Torah described as Toevah or Zimah, and the ones identified by Ramban and Rambam earlier as destructive to family life.  However, other sexual prohibitions may be more arbitrary and are considered chok.  Thus the Gemara in Yoma is referring to category number one, and the Maharal and Ramban that described sexual prohibitions as chok, are referring to the ones that are less easy to understand.  We then can say that the Rambam in Laws of Meilah omitted sexual prohibitions as an example of chok, or mishpat, because they do not fit neatly into either category.
2. Sexual prohibitions make logical sense but nevertheless we are irrationally drawn to them.  Therefore in Shemoneh Perakim, when discussing the virtue of obedience and overcoming temptation, Rambam (and similarly Ramban and Maharal) included sexual prohibitions under the category of chok.  Even though they are unlike shaatnez and meat and milk in the sense that we can understand their rationale, we are still instinctively drawn to them.  Therefore, they are closer to chok than mishpat. Because Rambam was suggesting theft or murder were basic human traits of decency and compassion and did not ordinarily require unusual tests of will and faith to uphold them, he could not include sexual urges in that group.  Thus, the Gemara in Yoma describes sexual prohibitions as a mishpat, and something that we would know even if the Torah did not write it, because logically we can agree that most sexual prohibitions preserve social and familial order.  

This second approach is appealing, because when you think about it, this is how people often behave. Indeed, most people who commit sexual indiscretions in ways that destroy their careers or families know that it is crazy behavior, yet they are drawn to transgress anyhow.  

There are also two other sources that point us in contradictory directions:

 

Rambam in Hilchos Rotzeach 4:9 seems to indicate that Arayos are bein Odom lamakom, which would seem to be chok, although you might make a distinction:

 

אֲפִלּוּ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר עֲרָיוֹת אוֹ חִלּוּל שַׁבָּת אֵינָן כִּשְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים. שֶׁאֵלּוּ עֲוֹנוֹת הֵן מֵעֲבֵרוֹת שֶׁבֵּין אָדָם לַמָּקוֹם אֲבָל שְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים מֵעֲבֵרוֹת שֶׁבֵּינוֹ לְבֵין חֲבֵרוֹ. 

 

We also have a Gemara Pesachim (119b) where Yaakov in the future meal for Tzaddikim

In the World to Come declares himself unworthy because he married two sisters, which would be later on forbidden by the Torah. This implies sexual prohibitions are logical and intrinsic, though once again, distinctions could be drawn.