To what extent is the sinner given recognition and respect by Torah society. The relationship with the sinner is a complex one with great emphasis placed on the community using social pressure and often legal enforcement to maintain desired behavior. Yet, despite this, there also seems to be a practical acceptance of the existence of sin and sinner, and often Torah society remains accepting and loving as we shall see in today’s discussion.

Our Gemara on Amud Aleph discusses a scenario where a man issues a divorce conditional upon his not returning by a certain day. (On a practical note, we may presume that such conditions were made as insurance against the husband becoming lost at sea or some other mishap, so that the wife does not become an agunah.) In any case, the Gemara discusses a scenario where a person was detained due to some circumstance out of his control.  Is the Get completed since, after all, he did not fulfill his condition of returning by the determined date.  Or, since he was unable to complete his condition due to circumstances and his intent was to return, is this considered as if he really did not intend to ratify the Get.  The Gemara considers one opinion that, in truth, the Get should not be ratified as his conditional provision was not fulfilled only due to unintended circumstances.  As in many areas of Torah law, when a matter is out of one’s control, there is no liability. Nevertheless, the Gemara says that in this case the rabbis took extra-legal action and ratified the Get anyhow (using a certain extraordinary loophole which is not part of today’s discussion.) The reason that the rabbis provided for this unusual extra-legal ruling is that the uncertainty about the circumstances over his inability to return and fulfill his condition would lead to an impossible situation where the wives would not be fully trusting regarding if it was a valid Get or not. To preempt this confusion, the rabbis ruled that it should be considered a Get for no matter what reason, so long as he did not return, even if technically he has a good excuse.  The formulation of the Gemara is interesting in that they offer two different feared responses that they wanted to forestall, depending on the personality of the wives:

The Tzenuos (righteous, God fearing) wives would doubt if his lack of return was due to a full willingness on his part to give the Get.  They will fear he was detained by some accident even when there is no evidence of such, and therefore will not remarry.  

The Perutzos (wanton, non God fearing) wives would immediately assume that the husband’s lack of return was due to his wish to grant the Get, and remarry before any due process of investigation.

In order to forestall confusion and trouble, the rabbis enacted an across the board provision that no matter what the circumstances, the divorce is valid, if he does not return after the set date.  What is fascinating about all this is that an extra-legal provision is enacted in order to accommodate the Perutzos equally to the Tzenuos; in terms of their basic needs and place in society, they are given equal consideration.

This is reminiscent of the Rambam’s commentary (Laws of Murder and Life Protection 13:13-14) regarding the obligation to help the sinner’s burden even before the righteous Jew: 

הַפּוֹגֵעַ בִּשְׁנַיִם אֶחָד רוֹבֵץ תַּחַת מַשָּׂאוֹ וְאֶחָד פָּרַק מֵעָלָיו וְלֹא מָצָא מִי שֶׁיִּטְעֹן עִמּוֹ. מִצְוָה לִפְרֹק בַּתְּחִלָּה מִשּׁוּם צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים וְאַחַר כָּךְ טוֹעֵן. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים כְּשֶׁהָיוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם שׂוֹנְאִים אוֹ אוֹהֲבִים. אֲבָל אִם הָיָה אֶחָד שׂוֹנֵא וְאֶחָד אוֹהֵב מִצְוָה לִטְעֹן עִם הַשּׂוֹנֵא תְּחִלָּה כְּדֵי לָכֹף אֶת יִצְרוֹ הָרַע:

If a person encountered two animals crouching under its load and the other in need of help in reloading it, he should help unload first to prevent the animal from suffering, and then load the other. This rule applies only where the owners are both enemies or both friends of the person in question. But if one is an enemy and the other a friend, he is required to load for the enemy first, in order to subdue his evil impulse.

הַשּׂוֹנֵא שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בַּתּוֹרָה לֹא מֵאֻמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם הוּא אֶלָּא מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל. וְהֵיאַךְ יִהְיֶה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל שׂוֹנֵא מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל וְהַכָּתוּב אוֹמֵר (ויקרא יט יז) "לֹא תִשְׂנָא אֶת אָחִיךָ בִּלְבָבֶךָ". אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים כְּגוֹן שֶׁרָאָהוּ לְבַדּוֹ שֶׁעָבַר עֲבֵרָה וְהִתְרָה בּוֹ וְלֹא חָזַר הֲרֵי זֶה מִצְוָה לְשָׂנְאוֹ עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה תְּשׁוּבָה וְיָשׁוּב מֵרִשְׁעוֹ. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁעֲדַיִן לֹא עָשָׂה תְּשׁוּבָה אִם מְצָאוֹ נִבְהָל בְּמַשָּׂאוֹ מִצְוָה לִטְעֹן וְלִפְרֹק עִמּוֹ וְלֹא יַנִּיחֶנּוּ נוֹטֶה לָמוּת שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהֶה בִּשְׁבִיל מָמוֹנוֹ וְיָבוֹא לִידֵי סַכָּנָה. וְהַתּוֹרָה הִקְפִּידָה עַל נַפְשׁוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל. בֵּין רְשָׁעִים בֵּין צַדִּיקִים. מֵאַחַר שֶׁהֵם נִלְוִים אֶל ה' וּמַאֲמִינִים בְּעִקַּר הַדָּת. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (יחזקאל לג יא) "אֱמֹר אֲלֵיהֶם חַי אָנִי נְאֻם ה' אֱלֹהִים אִם אֶחְפֹּץ בְּמוֹת הָרָשָׁע כִּי אִם בְּשׁוּב רָשָׁע מִדַּרְכּוֹ וְחָיָה".

The enemy mentioned in the Torah (Exodus 23:5) is of Jewish origin, and not a foreign enemy.— — If one finds him aghast with his load, one must help him load or unload and not leave him there to die. He may possibly stay on because of his property and be exposed to danger, and the Torah insists on saving Jewish lives, whether they are wicked or upright, since they are attached to the Lord and believe in the principles of religion, as it is written: "Tell them: By my life, says the Lord God, I have no desire for the death of the wicked man, but for him to live by giving up his evil course" (Ezekiel 33:11).