In our discussion on Amud Aleph, there is a dispute between Rav Sheshes and Rav Yosef regarding the qualification of a blind person to serve as a messenger for delivering a Get (bill of divorce). The Gemara explores various reasons for disqualifying a blind person, including the inability to testify accurately due to not knowing the parties involved. However, Rav Yosef challenges this argument by pointing out that a blind person can recognize others through voice recognition, similar to how people recognize their spouses in the dark.
What is intriguing about this discussion is that both Rav Sheshes and Rav Yosef were blind themselves. Berachos 58a and Kiddushin 31a)! It is difficult to accept that this is a mere coincidence. Considering that the subject matter is about the competency of a blind person, it would seem, at least out of respect, the other sages let them lead the discussion so in case anything pejorative would be described about this disability they had the opportunity to frame it themselves.
A deeper possibility is would their subjective experience as blind individuals influenced their understanding of the halakhic status of a blind person. It is possible that their personal experiences provided them with unique insights into the matter, leading to their active participation in the discussion.
This notion of subjective experience influencing halakha is a fascinating topic. It prompts us to consider the extent to which a posek's life experiences shape their legal decisions. In a conversation with my late father Z”L, who had a unique ability to extract psychological insights from Chazal, he shared an interesting teaching from the Gemara (Sanhedrin 36b) that suggests the impact of life experience on legal adjudication. The Gemara states that a very old person, a eunuch, and someone without children are not seated in the Sanhedrin. The reason given is that those who have not recently raised children may lack compassion. Even a cruel person is deemed ineligible by Rabbi Yehuda.
Rashi explains that an elderly person may have forgotten the challenges and responsibilities of raising children, thus potentially lacking a compassionate attitude. Similarly, someone who has never had children might be missing a certain merciful perspective. From this teaching, my father argued that if legal adjudication were solely based on objective truth, the life experiences and attitudes of the judges would not matter.
(As an aside the teaching in Sanhedrin suggests that parenthood is expected to cultivate patience and a compassionate outlook. It underscores the Talmud's emphasis on moral and psychological development for parents.)
Another source for subjectivity in halakha can be found in Ben Yehoyada, Shabbos 64b. Ben Yehoyada says Rabbi Akiva’s approach and sentiment informed his derashos. Amazingly, he says, Rabbi Akiva’s heart leaned in the direction of interpreting a verse to give more honor to women and allow them to adorn themselves even when Niddah, against the ruling of sages. (Here is the exact quote:
ומאחר שהיה נותן כבוד לנשים לכך שם על לבו לדרוש ולתת טעם בתכשיט הנשים גם בימי נדתה, כי התכשיטין הם כבוד האשה. )
In conclusion, the choice of discusants on the qualification of a blind person to serve as a messenger for delivering a Get (Rab Yosef and Rav Sheshes), raises thought-provoking questions about the influence of subjective experience in halakha. Through these insights, we gain a deeper appreciation for the complexities of legal interpretation and the intersection of personal experience with halakhic decision-making.