Our Gemara on Amud Aleph discusses certain legal limitations to an agent. What is considered halakhically as a verbal directive cannot be delegated to an agent. For example, if a man sent another person to direct the scribe as his agent to write the get, such a directive is mere words, and that agent cannot appoint another agent. However, if a man appoints an agent to deliver an already written get to his wife, that agent can appoint another agent. One explanation is that the get is now a tangible object and not mere words.

Sefer Sifse Maharash (Rav Shmuel Engel, 1853-1935) uses this idea as a clever derash to explain a Midrash that addresses a metaphysical question. The Midrash Rabbah (Bamidbar 21:1) tells us that God said about Pinchas:

פִּינְחָס בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן אַהֲרֹן הַכֹּהֵן (במדבר כה, יא), אָמַר הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא בְּדִין הוּא שֶׁיִּטֹּל שְׂכָרוֹ

"Phinehas ben Elazar [who is] the son of Aaron the priest": The Holy One, blessed be He, said, "It is appropriate that he should take his reward."

We have a general principle, what does not receive reward for mitzvos in this world (Kiddushin 39b), so why should Pinchas be different? Additionally, there is a general question that some have asked about the idea that God does not give rewards in this world. After all, God made it an ethical directive to pay workers on time. As it states in Vayikra (19:23), "Do not hold back the workers' payment until morning." Why then is God allowed to hold back the reward for mitzvos until the afterlife?

To answer this last question, Rav Engel cites a legal case from Bava Metzia (110b-11a):

ת"ר האומר לחבירו צא שכור לי פועלים שניהם אין עוברין משום בל תלין זה לפי שלא שכרן וזה לפי שאין פעולתו אצלו

The Sages taught: Concerning one who says to another, "Go out and hire workers for me," both of them do not violate the prohibition of delaying payment of wages if they fail to pay immediately. This one, the employer, is exempt because he did not hire them himself, and strictly speaking they are not his hired workers. And that one, the middleman, is exempt because his work is not performed for him.

Using this case, we can explain why God is not liable to make immediate payment and reward for mitzvos. God commanded Moshe to communicate with the Jewish people the commandments. This is just as we have learned earlier, a situation of an agent being unable to appoint a second agent to carry forth a verbal directive alone. On the other hand, Rav Engel suggests an opinion based on Kesef Mishna (Terumos 4:9) that in a case of a verbal directive for an inevitable act that must be done, the agent may appoint another if it cannot be done by the agent himself. Without getting into the lomdus too much, the logic is something along these lines: There isn’t much reason that the original appointee would have reservations about taking the initiative to appoint another person, because he knew the deed needed to be done and it was understood that the first agent was not able to do it.

We were taught in the Midrash (Rashi Balak 25:7) that at the time of crisis when Pinchas performed his zealous act, Moshe and his Beis Din temporarily forgot the halakha and did not know what to do. Only Pinchas remembered. Therefore, Moshe surmised that God specifically wanted Pinchas to perform this act. If so, this is not under the rubric of a messenger appointing workers for the householder. In this case, Pinchas was commanded directly by God. Therefore, God must make payment right away.

We can reframe this derash and understand it philosophically as well. The commandments God gives us are not really to be seen as work that we are hired out to do for Him. Instead, we might say that Moshe uncovered the truth and the will of God to help us understand the opportunity in the Torah. The mitzvos were given as commandments because they are no less than commandments. However, they are far more. It is like saying, "My doctor commanded me to take this medicine to save my life." The doctor really is not commanding you, nor are you doing him a favor by taking the medicine. But it has at least the same imperative drive as if he commanded you to take it. Our attitude toward the mitzvos in the Torah should be in a similar light.