Our Gemara on Amud Aleph delves into the profound measures one must undertake to demonstrate respect and dignity towards their own slave:

The passage continues: This means that there shall not be a situation in which you eat fine bread and he eats inferior bread [kibbar], bread from coarse flour mixed with bran, which is low quality. There shall not be a situation in which you drink aged wine and he drinks inferior new wine. There shall not be a situation in which you sleep comfortably on bedding made from soft sheets and he sleeps on straw. From here the Sages stated: Anyone who acquires a Hebrew slave is considered like one who acquires a master for himself, because he must be careful that the slave’s living conditions are equal to his own.

Tosafos (ibid) rules that if you have only one pillow or one portion, you must give it to the slave, even if it personally deprives you. Tosafos deduces this from the fact that the Gemara likens the slave to a master, not just a peer. Therefore, to properly care for the servant, one must be willing to make sacrifices and compromise their own comfort.

Some may question how this aligns with the teaching in Bava Metzia 62a:

The Gemara inquires: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, how does he interpret the verse: “And your brother shall live with you”? The Gemara answers: He requires the verse for the following baraisa: If two people were walking on a desolate path, and one of them has a jug [kiton] of water, and the situation is such that if both drink from the jug, both will die due to insufficient water. However, if only one of them drinks, he will reach a settled area. A dispute arises regarding the halakha. Ben Petora taught: It is preferable that both of them drink and die, preventing either from witnessing the death of the other. This was the accepted opinion until Rabbi Akiva came and taught that the verse states: “And your brother shall live with you,” indicating that your life takes precedence over the life of the other.

In this situation, where only one person can have their need met, the owner's well-being takes priority.

Two distinctions arise between the case of the Jewish servant and this scenario. The first distinction lies in the equal obligation of each person to save the other's life, creating a circular dilemma. If you were to offer your jug of water to the other person, they would then feel equally obligated to return it to you. Conversely, in the case of the servant and master, one wields power over the other, making it reasonable for the Torah to emphasize caring for the underprivileged. The second important distinction pertains to the gravity of the matter. In the life-or-death situation, temporary sacrifices become reasonable. In contrast, sacrificing an entire life might not be as reasonable.

Rav Kook, in Moreh Nevukhei Hador (3:2), suggests that one must discern the default principle and the exception between these scenarios. In Torah ethics, he contends that the default is to sacrifice for others. The exception to this rule arises only when a matter pertains to literal life or death, permitting one to prioritize their own well-being before others.