In our Gemara on Amud Aleph, there's a crucial warning regarding the consequences of labeling a fellow Jew a "Rasha" (evil person):

הָהוּא שַׁמּוֹתֵי מְשַׁמְּתִינַן לֵיהּ! דְּתַנְיָא: הַקּוֹרֵא לַחֲבֵירוֹ…. ״רָשָׁע״ – יוֹרֵד עִמּוֹ לְחַיָּיו!

One who calls another a "wicked person" allows the insulted person to harass them in all aspects of life.

Clearly, there must be limits to this injunction. What if the person is genuinely and profoundly wicked? Moreover, Moshe himself referred to both Dasan and Aviram as wicked. As stated in Shemos (Exodus 2:13):

וְהִנֵּ֛ה שְׁנֵֽי־אֲנָשִׁ֥ים עִבְרִ֖ים נִצִּ֑ים וַיֹּ֙אמֶר֙ לָֽרָשָׁ֔ע לָ֥מָּה תַכֶּ֖ה רֵעֶֽךָ׃

The next day, he found two Hebrews fighting, and he said to the wicked one, "Why do you strike your fellow?"

One might argue that Moshe didn't directly call him a "Rasha"; rather, the narrative in the verse described him as such. Yet, this interpretation is not adequate, as it raises questions about why the Torah models such behavior. Alternatively, one might argue differently: if the Torah labels someone as wicked, shouldn't it be reasonable to do so as well?

The Gemara in Sanhedrin seems to support the idea that certain individuals can be called "Rasha" based on this verse:

מ: אמר ריש לקיש המגביה ידו על חבירו אע"פ שלא הכהו נקרא רשע שנאמר (שמות ב, יג) ויאמר לרשע למה תכה רעך למה הכית לא נאמר אלא למה תכה אף על פי שלא הכהו נקרא רשע

Reish Lakish says: One who raises his hand to strike another, even if he ultimately does not strike him, is called wicked, as it is stated: "And two men of the Hebrews were struggling with each other, and he said to the wicked one: Why should you strike your friend?" (Exodus 2:13). The phrase: "Why did you strike?" is not stated, but rather: "Why should you strike," indicating that one who raised his hand to strike another, even if he ultimately did not strike him, is called wicked.

Yet, one could argue that the Gemara is saying that he is called wicked but not necessarily that you are permitted to call him wicked. However, this interpretation may not seem likely.

The Gemara, particularly in Yoma 86b, especially as explained by Rashi, is even more explicit. It states that for certain unrepentant sinners, it is not only permitted but proper to publicize their wicked status to prevent others from learning from them.

Returning to Moshe and Dasan and Aviram, the Midrash adds another layer (Shemos Rabbah 1:29 and Rashi). The use of the word "רעך" (your fellow) in the verse establishes a certain equality between the two individuals, suggesting that the second person was as evil as the first. The question then arises: What indicated their shared wickedness, especially since, on the surface, one might think the second person was merely defending themselves?

In Psychology of the Daf 22, we explored how Malbim argued that Moshe knew Dasan and Aviram were both evil because when people face dire circumstances together, they tend to become friends, not enemies. The fact that they were quarreling under the relentless persecution of their Egyptian overlords indicated something corrupt about their nature. Ohr HaChayyim and Tzofnas Paaneach suggested additionally that the introduction "שני אנשים נצים" (two men, quarreling) implies that they were equally involved in the fight, contributing to its escalation.

Regarding the Hebrew word for "quarrel," the precise definition and etymology are illuminating. The word "נץ" (netz) means "budding," as in budding fruit or the first edge of the sun during sunrise, known as "netz hachama" – literally the budding of the Sun. Related to this is the word "ניצוץ" (nitzutz), meaning spark. This linguistic insight in Hebrew implies that a quarrel or argument is viewed as the beginning, the budding, rather than the body of the fight. (In a related fashion, the Gemara Sanhedrin that we saw earlier describes the person is evil for raising his hand to hit, even before he actually hits.) The time to moderate or defuse the conflict is right at the outset.