In our Gemara, we've been discussing the concept of agency, "shelichut." Several important principles have emerged:
- It is more honorable to perform a mitzvah oneself rather than appointing an agent, even if the mitzvah could technically be carried out by someone else.
- The concept of "Letikune Shidarticha" suggests that if an agent performs an action that clearly contradicts the appointer's intent, the agency is not valid for that particular action.
- There is a fundamental rule that "Ein shelich l'var averah," meaning there is no agency when it comes to sin. This is based on the idea that no one can justify committing a sin by claiming they were merely following orders. The Talmud raises a rhetorical question: "To whom does one obey? The student or the master?" In essence, how could anyone direct another person to commit a sin as their agent when it goes against the will of God?
The Likkutei Halachos (Hilchos Sheluchim, Choshen Mishpat, 1:1, 2:6, and 5:2) provides a profound insight into these principles. It suggests that these ideas about agency relate to different levels of human consciousness and perception. The core self, represented by the human soul, possesses a level of understanding and comprehension that transcends sensory data and physical perception.
Mitzvos can be fulfilled in two ways:
- Through rational faculties, human effort, and the agency of a person. This is the more external aspect of mitzvah observance.
- Through a deeper level of knowing, perception, and performance that occurs within a realm of truth deep within the self. This aspect is not considered an agency; rather, it represents the juncture of the soul and God, completely aligned. This is the internal and more profound aspect of mitzvah observance.
Based on this understanding, we can say that it is "mitzvah bo yoser mi'beshlucho," preferable to perform the mitzvah directly without agency. In other words, our involvement in fulfilling a mitzvah should stem from a deep awareness and connection beyond mere rational processing.
Expanding on this idea, sin itself is never truly representative of our core selves. Since there is no agency for sinful actions, our physical drives and perceptions that lead us to sin do not reflect the true essence of who we are. Instead, they are distortions that pull us away from our deeper knowledge and desires.
In this context, the statement by Reish Lakish that "a man commits a transgression only if a spirit of folly [shetus] enters him" (Sotah 3a) suggests that sinful actions result from a deviation from our true selves, a departure from our inherent worthiness, as Abraham Maslow's principles emphasize:
"Each person, simply by being, is inherently worthy. While any given action may be negative, these actions do not cancel out the value of a person."