We learned in our Mishna on Amud Beis, that according to the Tanna Kamma, an ownerless ox that gored and killed someone is still executed. This suggests that killing of a murderous ox is not merely a punishment for the owner but even a punishment for the ox.  At first glance, this would seem absurd, to hold an ox liable for its choices, as if it is intelligent.  However, we have already seen that the Talmudic view of animal thought is more nuanced. Though they are incapable of advanced reasoning, and the sages considered only humans endowed with speech which allows for orderly analytic thought (see Onkelos Bereishis 2:7), they still saw them as capable of intentioned actions (see Bava Kamma 19b).

Related to the idea of animal intention and liability, there is an interesting verse  (Bereishis 9:5):

וְאַ֨ךְ אֶת־דִּמְכֶ֤ם לְנַפְשֹֽׁתֵיכֶם֙ אֶדְרֹ֔שׁ מִיַּ֥ד כׇּל־חַיָּ֖ה אֶדְרְשֶׁ֑נּוּ וּמִיַּ֣ד הָֽאָדָ֗ם מִיַּד֙ אִ֣ישׁ אָחִ֔יו אֶדְרֹ֖שׁ אֶת־נֶ֥פֶשׁ הָֽאָדָֽם׃

However, of the blood of your souls, I will demand an account; from the hand of every beast will I demand it. From the hand of man, even from the hand of man’s own brother, will I demand an account of man’s soul.

The simple reading of the verse seems to indicate that God will punish a beast for killing a human. Radak and Ramban both comment on this, wondering how animals could be held liable.  They each answer somewhat differently, but what they say amounts to agreeing that animals are not morally liable, but as a matter of legality must be held liable. Murder cannot be tolerated without a consequence. 

This notion is hinted at in other areas of the Torah, where there is a suggestion that the land itself becomes polluted by murder and must somehow be cleansed to avoid further ramifications of this injustice. See for example Bereishis (4:10) and Devarim (19:10, and 21:9). 

There is also an odd midrash that seems to hold animals responsible for higher order thought and a decision to martyr themselves in the name of God. Pesachim (53b) tells us that Chananiah, Mishael, and Azariah decided to defy Nebuchadnezzar’s orders and allow themselves to be thrown into a furnace based on the behavior of the frogs during the plague, who threw themselves into the Egyptian ovens:

With regard to frogs, which are not commanded concerning the sanctification of the name of God, it is written: “And the river shall swarm with frogs, which shall go up and come into your house, and into your bedchamber, and onto your bed, and into the houses of your servants, and upon your people, and into their ovens and kneading bowls” (Exodus 7:28). When are kneading bowls found near the oven? You must say that it is when the oven is hot. If in fulfilling the command to harass the Egyptians, the frogs entered burning ovens, all the more so, we, who are commanded concerning the sanctification of the name of God, should deliver ourselves to be killed in the fiery furnace for that purpose.

The commentaries explain this Gemara in less literal ways, that is something along the lines that Chananiah, Mishael, and Azariah drew inspiration from the idea that the frogs could defy survival instinct, or perhaps the opposite, that a Jew must follow God’s command without forethought like an animal behaves with instinct. This last idea is reminiscent to Rabbi Akiva’s argument about why he taught Torah, despite the danger to his life in defying a Roman edict (Berachos 61b):

To what can this be compared? It is like a fox walking along a riverbank when he sees fish gathering and fleeing from place to place. The fox said to them: From what are you fleeing?

They said to him: We are fleeing from the nets that people cast upon us. He said to them: Do you wish to come up onto dry land, and we will reside together just as my ancestors resided with your ancestors? The fish said to him: You are the one of whom they say, he is the cleverest of animals? You are not clever; you are a fool. If we are afraid in the water, our natural habitat which gives us life, then in a habitat that causes our death, all the more so. The moral is: So too, we Jews, now that we sit and engage in Torah study, about which it is written: “For that is your life, and the length of your days” (Deuteronomy 30:20), we fear the empire to this extent; if we proceed to sit idle from its study, as its abandonment is the habitat that causes our death, all the more so will we fear the empire.

We also find the donkey of Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair who would not eat untithed produce (Chullin 7a), although that might have been due to some spiritual effect or instinct instilled via ownership by such a great master, as we saw in Psychology of the Daf, Bava Kama 37.

So it is likely that we do not ascribe intelligence to animals in terms of rational thought, but they may still be capable of rudimentary thought, and benefit or suffer in the physical world based on their decisions. If the ox who gores a human and kills him is indeed liable and culpable for its actions, surely we who are intelligent must be even more careful about the effects of our actions.