Our Gemara on amud aleph makes a seemingly contradictory assertion that a deaf mute is lacking in enough intelligence or discernment to acquire possessions. The rabbis enacted a ruling that regardless, they should be allowed to possess objects. This was in order to forestall and protect a vulnerable population (the mentally impaired) from financial abuse.  If two people pick up an ownerless object at the same time, they acquire it jointly, even though each does not have full possession nor has made an act of full acquisition. In effect, there is a tacit agreement that each becomes the other’s agent to achieve a joint acquisition. Therefore, what will be the case if two deaf-mutes simultaneously attempt to acquire an object? Technically, lacking in proper intellectual discernment, they cannot function as agents for the other.  Nevertheless, the rabbis extended their enactment to even this case, in order to prevent these two deaf-mutes from quarreling with others, who could legally take the item from their hands, as they did not really acquire it.

 

So far all this is understandable.  Then we have a surprise ruling. If a deaf-mute and a fully rational person attempt to jointly acquire an object, neither ends up owning it.  The deaf mute cannot function as an agent for the rational person, so the rational person  has no partner in acquisition. Since the object must be jointly acquired if it is being picked up simultaneously, and neither person alone has full possession, the rational person will not acquire the object, nor will the mentally incompetent person.

 

Why are the rabbis not concerned in this scenario that it will also lead to quarrel? The Gemara answers that the deaf-mute will see that his counterpart did not acquire the object, and though he may not possess the intelligence to follow the Sages’ rationale, he will accept it as fair since both parties lose out equally. So long as he perceives fairness, it will not lead to a quarrel. This is a surprising idea that a deaf-mute, deemed by the rabbis as mentally incompetent and unable to make acquisitions, can still be considered intelligent enough to discern moral fairness.

 

This shows that morality might be partially instinctive and not just subject to society’s arbitrary values. There have been a fascinating series of experiments conducted on young infants, whereby measuring their actions and choices following an observed staged event, seems to show moral instinct. According to research conducted by Paul Bloom and colleagues (NYT, May 5, 2010, “The Moral Life of Babies”), the following was observed:

 

• The research involved children watching animated movies featuring geometric characters with faces. In one scenario, a red ball attempted to ascend a hill, sometimes aided by a yellow square and hindered by a green triangle. The study aimed to understand infants' expectations regarding the ball's attitudes towards the characters assisting or hindering it. Results indicated that both 9- and 12-month-olds showed surprise when the ball approached the hinderer, suggesting they expected it to approach the helper.

 

• Further studies explored whether infants' preferences were due to attraction to helpful individuals, repulsion from hinderers, or both. Introducing a neutral character into the animated movie revealed that infants preferred helpers over neutrals and neutrals over hinderers, indicating both inclinations were at play.

 

• The research also examined whether babies possessed subtle moral capacities beyond preferring good and avoiding bad. Testing 8-month-olds, the study found that babies preferred puppets who rewarded good behavior and punished bad behavior. Interestingly, despite their overall preference for good actors, babies were drawn to bad actors when they were punishing bad behavior.

 

That last finding is the pièce de résistance, showing amazing discernment and nuance. The eight month olds ordinarily rejected the aggressive puppet, still PREFER the aggressive puppet if its aggression was a justified punishment of an offending puppet.

 

This research supports the idea that individuals with limited intelligence possess an intuitive sense of morality, as proposed by the Gemara. The Rabbis, drawing from tradition and divine insight, were keen observers of human nature, even in unexpected ways.