Our Gemara on Amud Beis discusses a case in which a buyer and seller are in dispute over if the purchased ox was sold for labor purposes or for slaughter. The difference being, that if it was found to be an unruly ox known to gore, the purchase would be deemed under false pretenses and be refunded. However, the seller maintains that he sold the ox under the presumption that it was for slaughter, thus the ox’s nature is irrelevant, and the purchase should stand. The Gemara then considers if we may use statistical analysis as evidence. In other words, may we reason that since the majority of oxen are sold for labor, we should give more credence to the claim of the buyer. Shmuel holds, though it is a general principle that Torah law follows the majority, such as a smaller amount of non-kosher food becomes nullified if mixed into a larger amount, this does not apply to monetary considerations. We cannot use the presumption of majority to prove a certain status that adjudicates a financial obligation or benefit, and the sale stands. As is classically the case when it comes to financial claims, the burden of proof rests on the claimant.  

There have been different lomdishe explanations for this principle that the majority does not nullify the minority in regard to financial evidence. I would like to offer a psychological and spiritual explanation for the function of this principle and what attitude the Torah promotes. When it comes to practical matters, reality is often about consensus. Is the rectangular box in front of you a small table or a footstool? It makes a difference whether you will eat off of it or rest your feet on it. Yet, it is a subjective imposition, and you’ll get along well with others if your subjective reality matches the consensus of others, and you’ll experience much social friction in case you have difficulty making that determination accurately. (“Get your feet off my table”, or “Why are you putting food on my ottoman?”)

A good portion of Torah law and prohibitions are about obedience and adherence to norms that promote societal welfare and personal balance of character (see Moreh Nevuchim III:26 and 27.) Therefore, if a Torah prohibition is nullified, it is no longer an apparent act of violation, as the forbidden action or substance is not manifest. This idea also can be used to explain the Rambam’s distinctive position regarding an ambiguous or undetermined prohibition.  According to basic Torah law, it is not prohibited to violate an ambiguous or undetermined prohibition, such as eating a piece of meat that it is unclear if kosher or not. The idea that one must err on the side of caution, and strictly abstain from even possible prohibitions of indefinite status is only rabbinically mandated. (See Laws of the Impurity of a Corpse, 9:12.)

On the other hand, money and assets are the epitome of personal subjective rights. After all, the idea that a person can own anything is built on an assertion of the individual over the general reality. Think about it philosophically. Why does anyone have a right to anything? God made it all. I don’t own my potatoes, more than my tractor or my eyes and lungs. Yet the Torah allows for this thing called ownership, so as to align with human nature and motivations. Possession is already the personal assertion over the general. Keeping that in mind, it is easier to understand morally and metaphysically why the burden of proof is on the claimant who wants to extract money, and he cannot use statistics or majority as evidence.  He cannot use a generality to overcome a subjective individual apprehension.