Our Gemara on Amud Beis discusses how to resolve discrepancies in the statements of a seller, where the seller’s first clause indicates approximation, and the second clause indicates specificity, or vice versa. For example, if the seller says to the buyer: “I am selling you a plot of land of a certain size measured precisely with a rope more or less”, thereby attaching to the sale two contradictory stipulations. Or if the seller says to the buyer: “I am selling you a plot of land of a certain size more or less measured precisely with rope.” The words, “measured precisely with a rope”, contradict the words “more or less”. The gemara records a dispute between Ben Nanes and the Sages as to whether we follow the final clause, or if we remain in doubt and follow the more conservative implication of the two clauses.

 

The nature of contradictory statements is itself a preoccupation in the study of our sacred texts and traditions. The Gemara is built upon noticing apparent contradictions and discrepancies between teachings. Sometimes the resolution involves assigning the contradictory opinions to two different schools of thought, sometimes the contradiction may be due to one opinion recanting at a later time. However, the overwhelming majority of contradictions in teachings are resolved via making distinctions between the two apparently contradictory cases, thereby creating newly discovered aspects to the law.

 

Notably, the Baaley Tosafos continued this tradition via their encyclopedic knowledge of Talmudic teachings, often highlighting apparent contradictions, and then making distinctions between the cases. Sometimes each answer of the Tosafos creates a different halachic position. If a simplistic approach had been used, and we simply said the two teachings do not agree with each other, Shulchan Aruch would have been a quarter of its size. Without Tosafos noticing and raising contradictions not explicitly found in the Gemara, many many aspects and refinements to the law would remain undiscovered. (Just one example amongst hundreds can be found in Tosafos Berachos (8a, “Rav Sheshes”) whereby several explanations and distinctions are given regarding Rav Sheshes’ conduct during the reading of the Torah, and how it translates into halachic distinctions in Shulchan Aruch O.C. (146:2).

 

How to approach contradictions, and what one may learn from them is essential to the study of authoritative material. Since both teachings are presumed to be valid when working with authoritative and revered texts, all contradictions must be resolved, and cannot be dismissed as errors. The Rambam, in his introduction to the Guide for the Perplexed, provides a distinctive analysis of how to approach contradictions, which is instructive in the development of logical analytical thought, and pertinent to understanding his methodology. It is worth quoting much of what he says in the original, because it is an intellectual tour de force, and part of what makes him a unique intellectual star, amongst our venerated and brilliant sages. He states:

 

There are seven causes of inconsistencies and contradictions to be met with in a literary work. 

 

The first cause arises from the fact that the author collects the opinions of various men, each differing from the other, but neglects to mention the name of the author of any particular opinion. In such a work contradictions or inconsistencies must occur, since any two statements may belong to two different authors. 

 

Second cause: The author holds at first one opinion which he subsequently rejects: in his work., however, both his original and altered views are retained. 

 

Third cause: The passages in question are not all to be taken literally: some only are to be understood in their literal sense, while in others figurative language is employed, which includes another meaning besides the literal one: or, in the apparently inconsistent passages, figurative language is employed which, if taken literally, would seem to be contradictories or contraries. 

 

Fourth cause: The premises are not identical in both statements, but for certain reasons they are not fully stated in these passages: or two propositions with different subjects which are expressed by the same term without having the difference in meaning pointed out, occur in two passages. The contradiction is therefore only apparent, but there is no contradiction in reality. 

 

The fifth cause is traceable to the use of a certain method adopted in teaching and expounding profound problems. Namely, a difficult and obscure theorem must sometimes be mentioned and assumed as known, for the illustration of some elementary and intelligible subject which must be taught beforehand, the commencement being always made with the easier thing. The teacher must therefore facilitate, in any manner which he can devise, the explanation of those theorems, which have to be assumed as known, and he must content himself with giving a general though somewhat inaccurate notion on the subject. It is, for the present, explained according to the capacity of the students, that they may comprehend it as far as they are required to understand the subject. Later on, the same subject is thoroughly treated and fully developed in its right place. 

 

Sixth cause: The contradiction is not apparent, and only becomes evident through a series of premises. The larger the number of premises necessary to prove the contradiction between the two conclusions, the greater is the chance that it will escape detection, and that the author will not perceive his own inconsistency. Only when from each conclusion, by means of suitable premises, an inference is made, and from the enunciation thus inferred, by means of proper arguments, other conclusions are formed, and after that process has been repeated many times, then it becomes clear that the original conclusions are contradictories or contraries. Even able writers are liable to overlook such inconsistencies. If, however, the contradiction between the original statements can at once be discovered, and the author, while writing the second, does not think of the first, he evinces a greater deficiency, and his words deserve no notice whatever. 

 

Seventh cause: It is sometimes necessary to introduce such metaphysical matter as may partly be disclosed, but must partly be concealed: while, therefore, on one occasion the object which the author has in view may demand that the metaphysical problem be treated as solved in one way, it may be convenient on another occasion to treat it as solved in the opposite way. The author must endeavor, by concealing the fact as much as possible, to prevent the uneducated reader from perceiving the contradiction. 

 

Inconsistencies occurring in the Mishnah and Baraisos are traceable to the first cause. You meet frequently in the Gemara with passages like the following:—“Does not the beginning of the passage contradict the end? No: the beginning is the dictum of a certain Rabbi: the end that of an other”; or “Rabbi (Jehudah ha-Nasi) approved of the opinion of a certain rabbi in one case and gave it therefore anonymously, and having accepted that of another rabbi in the other case he introduced that view without naming the authority”; or “Who is the author of this anonymous dictum? Rabbi A.” “Who is the author of that paragraph in the Mishnah? Rabbi B.” Instances of this kind are innumerable. 

 

Apparent contradictions or differences occurring in the Gemara may be traced to the first cause and to the second, as e.g., “In this particular case he agrees with this rabbi”; or “He agrees with him in one point, but differs from him in another”; or “These two dicta are the opinions of two Amoraim, who differ as regards the statement made by a certain rabbi.” These are examples of contradictions traceable to the first cause. The following are instances which may be traced to the second cause. “Rabba altered his opinion on that point”; it then becomes necessary to consider which of the two opinions came second. Again,” In the first recension of the Talmud by Rabbi Ashi, he made one assertion, and in the second a different one.” 

 

What is remarkable and noteworthy is that the Rambam does NOT mention the predominant form of contradiction and resolution found in the Gemara, which we described earlier and identified as a major process in halacha, as exemplified by the Baaley Tosafos.  The Rambam should have mentioned Clause Four, as deducing fine distinctions in apparently contradictory teachings is unquestionably the majority of Talmudic discussion.  This is a mystery and begs greater study.  

 

Another notable feature is what the Rambam says about his own writings:

 

Any inconsistency discovered in the present work will be found to arise in consequence of the fifth cause or the seventh. Notice this, consider its truth, and remember it well, lest you misunderstand some of the chapters in this book.

 

This is notable. We are used to examining every word of our revered sages, and constantly derive new insight by resolving the apparent contradictions and extra words via this methodology.  All this is implied. However, the Rambam is the only Rishon that I am aware of that tells you straight out, “If you see an inconsistency in my words, look deeper as there is a specific reason for it.”  This is key to understanding the Rambam’s mind and approach.  Yet, this also makes the Rambam’s omission of applying this similar principles (causes four and seven)  to the teachings of the Gemara even more mysterious.  How could he neglect giving the words of the Gemara at least the same courtesy as he asks that you give toward his own writings? 

 

In the ultimate circular reasoning, perhaps this is an instance where the Rambam deliberately uses a contradiction to hide something that should not be stated explicitly, as he explained in the Seventh Cause? But if so, what would that secret be, and why would it be so necessary to conceal it? I believe there is something about the halachic process that he wants to hint at but will not say, because those without the proper wisdom and understanding would misconstrue it. How that precisely relates to the dialectical process of the Gemara and what he means is unclear, but I think it’s along the lines of one of the age-old problems in analyzing any valued text. When an interpretation arises, is it about what the author truly meant, or is it a new idea that is legitimate because it arises intrinsically from the words, even if the author didn’t mean it consciously? In Torah study, are the derashos of the pesukim and even the answers given to resolve contradictions about the intention of the original teaching, or a new and legitimate thought process that stems from the original, like a tree that comes from the seed but is not the seed?

 

Consider this fascinating aggadah about Moshe’s encounter with Rabbi Akiva via time travel (Menachos 29b): 

 

Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: When Moses ascended on High, he found the Holy One, Blessed be He, sitting and tying crowns on the letters of the Torah. Moses said before God: Master of the Universe, who is preventing You from giving the Torah without these additions? God said to him: There is a man who is destined to be born after several generations, and Akiva ben Yosef is his name; he is destined to derive from each and every thorn of these crowns mounds upon mounds of halakhot. It is for his sake that the crowns must be added to the letters of the Torah.

 

Moses said before God: Master of the Universe, show him to me. God said to him: Return behind you. Moses went and sat at the end of the eighth row in Rabbi Akiva’s study hall and did not understand what they were saying. Moses’ strength waned, as he thought his Torah knowledge was deficient. When Rabbi Akiva arrived at the discussion of one matter, his students said to him: My teacher, from where do you derive this? Rabbi Akiva said to them: It is a halacha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. When Moses heard this, his mind was put at ease, as this too was part of the Torah that he was to receive.

 

Ironically, Moshe cannot understand the Shiur given by Rabbi Akiva. And, incredibly, he discovers that the content of the lecture was “law taught by Moshe from Sinai! This Aggadah seems to be hinting at the same issue.  The Rambam left out explaining this matter explicitly as part of the Gemara’s system of resolving contradiction because it is subtle and requires the ability to recognize a not very black and white way of understanding the halachic process and transmission of Moshe from Sinai.