Our Gemara on amud aleph continues discussing special enactments and protections that the rabbis put in place to ensure that, although daughters do not inherit alongside their brothers, stipends and allowances are set aside from the estate to provide for them and assist with marriage expenses. The Mishna on the previous amud states:

In the case of one who died and left behind both sons and daughters, when the estate is large, the sons inherit it, and the daughters are provided for from it, according to the stipulations of the deceased’s marriage contract with their mother. In the case of a small estate, which is insufficient to provide for both sons and daughters, the daughters are provided for. And if the sons—who, in this case, receive neither inheritance nor sustenance—have no other means of support, they may request charity at the doors. Admon says rhetorically: “Do I lose out just because I am male?” He holds that the sons should also receive sustenance.

Our Gemara questions the logic behind Admon’s objection.

Admon says rhetorically: “Do I lose out just because I am male?” The Gemara asks: What is he saying? Abaye explains that Admon’s concern is: “Because I am male and fit to engage in the study of Torah, I lose out and must beg instead of studying?” Rava challenges this interpretation, asking if this means that only those who study Torah should inherit, while those who do not study would forfeit inheritance. Instead, Rava offers that Admon’s concern is: “Because I am male and therefore fit to inherit in the case of a large estate, should I lose my inheritance entirely in a small estate?”

Tosafos (s.v. Ela Me-Atah) raises a question about Rava’s objection to Abaye’s idea, as there is a teaching later on (141a) that implies male children’s obligation to study Torah and to be financially supported is a factor in prioritizing support for sons over daughters. The Gemara later states:

“It is a mitzvah to provide sustenance for daughters. And one can infer kal v’chomer (all the more so) that it is a mitzvah to provide for sons, who are engaged in Torah study.”

Tosafos answers by distinguishing between a mitzvah and a legal requirement. While Rava argues that Torah study alone does not decisively affect inheritance law (otherwise, the law would prioritize sons who study Torah over those who do not), the Sages still recognize that supporting Torah study is important. Thus, in a general case, inheritance should follow financial norms. However, in a particular situation where someone must choose whom to support, priority may go to the one who studies Torah.

This highlights a distinction between what Torah law considers ethical and what is strictly a legal obligation. Some argue that there is no ethics separate from Torah, meaning that if the Torah encourages or permits an act, it is ethical, and if the Torah prohibits or discourages it, it is unethical. For instance, when lying is permitted to maintain peace (Yevamos 65b), it is not only permitted but also deemed ethical. Similarly, when one is permitted to kill to prevent murder (Sanhedrin 73a), it is considered ethical. However, law as a public and enforceable system must often operate in broad terms, and thus cannot always account for the nuances of specific situations.

The Maggid Mishneh (Hilchos Shecheinim 14:2) comments on Torah’s general directives about morality, such as, “You shall do what is proper and good” (Devarim 6:18) and “You shall be holy” (Vayikra 19:2). He notes that these commandments set ethical standards rather than detailed prescriptions because human character and circumstances are too variable. Therefore, our Sages wrote some rules as halakha and some as acts of extra piety rather than legal obligations.

As people bound by Torah, we sometimes conflate what is legally permitted with what is wise or ethical. However, not everything permitted is prudent, nor is every imprudent act forbidden. There are times to follow the strict letter of the law and other times to go beyond it. In our case, according to Tosafos, the Sages believed inheritance law should follow financial principles rather than subjective criteria like Torah study. However, in individual situations, one may prioritize supporting someone who studies Torah, even if it is not a halakhic requirement. This flexibility allows for consideration of specific priorities and situational needs without rigid legislation.