Our Gemara on Amud Beis further discusses the status of a deathbed gift and whether such a gift is automatically retracted if the person miraculously recovers. To assume an implied condition that would reverse an explicitly granted gift, there must be unambiguous evidence that this was the giver’s intention. Therefore, the rule only applies if the person gave away all his possessions, leaving nothing behind. Such actions indicate someone who has no expectation of survival, making it possible to nullify the gift based on a false pretense. But if the person left any material possessions, it suggests he may have anticipated surviving and chose to give the other assets away regardless. (See Rashbam here, De-Mikarkaei.)

Leaving behind any assets, therefore, signals the possibility that the person thought he might survive. Consequently, the prior gifts are valid, as they were given with the knowledge that recovery was a possibility. However, this reasoning only holds if there is no alternative explanation for why the person retained some assets. If a more likely explanation exists, then we would have no grounds to assume the person expected to survive while still intending to make the gifts.

Our Gemara on 148b considers the case of a person on their deathbed who bequeathed their entire estate to charity. If the person recovers, should the gift be reversed? Or is charity different—perhaps the person wanted the donation to go through no matter what? This could be because people generally do not wish to retract a mitzvah, or because the person may believe his recovery was a result of the merit of his donation.

Rav Sruly Bornstein, in his Daf Yomi shiur (prior cycle 148), raises a question: Why does the Gemara focus only on a case where the person donated all his assets to charity? Even if he donated only a portion of his possessions—say, up to 80%—we might still attribute this to his adherence to the prohibition against giving more than one-fifth to charity. As it is taught in Kesuvos (50a):

“In Usha, the Sages instituted that one who dispenses his money to charity should not dispense more than one-fifth…lest he render himself destitute and need the help of others.”

Thus, even in the charity scenario, holding back some possessions should not necessarily indicate the person believed he might survive. If so, why does the Gemara only consider the situation where the entire estate was donated?

In reality, there are exceptions to this one-fifth threshold. Since its purpose is to prevent donors from impoverishing themselves, someone who does not expect to survive does not need to adhere to this limit. Indeed, the Shulchan Aruch (YD, 249:1) rules that a person on his deathbed may give all his possessions to charity (provided this does not bypass his children’s inheritance; see CM 282:1).

However, this explanation only works according to the Shulchan Aruch. Another opinion, cited by Rabbi Akiva Eiger (ibid, quoting the Sheiltos), holds that even on one’s deathbed, no more than one-third of one’s estate should be given to charity.

A possible resolution is that even the Sheiltos might distinguish between routine deathbed situations and cases where the person is struck suddenly and violently ill. An elderly person nearing the end of life due to old age might not feel compelled to take extraordinary measures for a reprieve, as he does not view himself as dying from a curable illness but from the natural progression of age. However, someone on his deathbed due to a sudden illness might feel justified in giving away all their assets to charity, as he seeks any merit they can muster.

We are taught (Rosh Hashanah 16b) that charity can overturn a heavenly decree. The Chofetz Chaim (Ahavas Chessed 20:3) rules that the 20% threshold does not apply when charity is given to save a life. We might then argue, how much more so (kal v’chomer), when one’s own life is at stake and should be allowed to give whatever he feels it would take.

If this reasoning is valid, it would imply that spiritual efforts aimed at invoking supernatural life-saving effects fall under the same halachic rubric as actions permitted in emergencies, even if they would ordinarily be forbidden. This is reminiscent of an unusual halachic ruling permitting someone to send a telegram on Shabbos to request a certain tzaddik to pray for a terminally ill person. This topic will be explored further in our upcoming blog post, Psychology of the Daf, Bava Basra 153.