Our Gemara on Amud Beis notes that most people who fall ill eventually recover. This observation has legal implications in cases where a person on their deathbed bequeaths their estate to someone else, but later recovers. Such directives can be invalidated retroactively if the person recovers, and the estate reverts to its rightful heirs. The rightful air does not have to prove that his father did not in fact die, because in those cases he would have unless the recipient of the gifts can prove that death followed. 

This principle underlies a debate in halacha regarding whether one should pray for someone ill in a distant city. The Likkutei Maharil (quoted by the Chasam Sofer, Gittin 28) rules against offering a mi shebeirach prayer for a sick person in another location, reasoning that the individual may have already died, rendering the prayer disrespectful and in vain. However, the Nachalas Shiva (40) argues, based on our Gemara, that statistically, the person has likely recovered or remains alive, so the prayer is appropriate.

Chasam Sofer defends the logic of the Likkutei Maharil. If you add up the odds of both recovery or death, then there is more likelihood that there was some status change where prayer is no longer needed one way or the other. However, the Chasam Sofer ultimately sides with the Nachalas Shiva because of an additional reason. Torah prohibitions are suspended even in uncertain cases of life-threatening danger. Therefore, even the small risk of offering a “prayer in vain” is justified when there is potential to save a life.

This raises a fascinating halachic question: Can spiritual interventions aimed at life-saving outcomes justify actions that might otherwise violate Torah law?

One famous and controversial responsum addresses this issue. Rav Shalom Mordechai Schwadron (Responsa Maharsham III:225) discusses whether it is permissible to send a telegram on Shabbos to inform a great tzaddik to pray for a terminally ill individual. He explores the theoretical possibility that for someone who truly believes in the healing power of a tzaddik’s prayers—and if the tzaddik is indeed of such a caliber—this might be considered a life-saving measure. Nevertheless, he approaches this cautiously, recalling an incident in his youth where a dayan was censured for advocating similar actions and stripped of his post.

While the Chasam Sofer permits certain risks, such as a potentially vain prayer, to facilitate a spiritual cure, it is unclear if this leniency extends to outright violations of Shabbos or other prohibitions. This distinction may hinge on whether the spiritual action in question is universally accepted as a legitimate life-saving intervention.